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PERSONA–CHARACTER COPYRIGHTS AND MERGER’S
ROLE IN THE EVOLUTION OF ENTERTAINMENT
EXPRESSIONS
ABSTRACT
Millions of people tuned in to Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report to
learn about the state of our nation from the renowned satirical character,
Stephen Colbert. Millions more tuned in to watch the same Stephen Colbert
make his return on CBS’s The Late Show with Stephen Colbert. However,
after his first television revival, Viacom quickly shut down any possible future
return, claiming that it, not Stephen Colbert the actor, held the copyright to the
character Stephen Colbert. While this is not the first time that an actor was
ineligible to maintain control over a persona–character he crafted, this
incident exposed that copyright law does not have a means of protecting
characters who become a true extension of the living, breathing actor.
The law does not allow the content of an idea to be protected, nor does it
allow protection when an otherwise protected expression has merged with an
idea. The policy behind this prohibition is to allow creativity to flourish so
society benefits. When the line is blurred between an actor and a character so
much that the character is inextricably linked to the actor, the law should label
the idea and the expression merged. By relying on the merger doctrine as a
personal affirmative defense in a greater capacity than courts have recognized
previously, the actor can maintain control over a character that has become
his counterpart.
This Comment defines what qualifies as a character and what makes the
character eligible or ineligible for copyright protection. This Comment
proposes placing characters on a spectrum, from those that are granted full
copyright protection to those that are denied legal security. When the line is
not clear regarding whether a character is an original expression or is a
persona of the actor, this Comment suggests utilizing the merger doctrine as a
personal affirmative defense to eliminate a studio’s inflexible copyright control
and to release the character into the actor’s shared control.

ALTMAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

736

4/23/2018 12:22 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:735

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 737
I. BACKGROUND .................................................................................... 739
A. What Is a Character? ................................................................ 740
B. What Is a Copyrightable Character? ........................................ 743
C. Limitations on Copyright Protection for a Character ............... 747
D. The Right of Publicity ................................................................ 751
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN
CHARACTER PROTECTION AND WAYS TO FILL THE GAP .................... 753
A. The Character Spectrum and the Rights Associated with
Persona Protection .................................................................... 754
B. Utilizing Merger to Fill the Spectrum’s Gray Area ................... 757
III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO USING THE MERGER DOCTRINE ................ 759
A. Joint Authorship to Allow for Equal Ownership ....................... 759
B. Work Made for Hire That Eliminates Any Potential Claim to
Ownership ................................................................................. 762
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE CHARACTER COPYRIGHT GAP AND MERGER’S
ROLE IN THE CHARACTER LIFE SPAN ................................................. 764
A. Merger as an Affirmative Defense Creates Royalty-Free
Licenses to Combat Change of Control Issues .......................... 765
B. Shifting Control Between the Studio and the Actor During a
Character’s Life Span ................................................................ 767
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 769

ALTMAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

4/23/2018 12:22 PM

EVOLUTION OF ENTERTAINMENT EXPRESSIONS

737

INTRODUCTION
“So it is with a heavy heart that I announce that thanks to corporate
lawyers, the character of Stephen Colbert host of ‘The Colbert Report,’ will
never be seen again.”1 These words by Stephen Colbert officially put his
character in a grave—that is, the Stephen Colbert persona–character we all
know and love who provided witty satire concerning political developments
and current events four days a week for nine years and 1,446 episodes.2 The
talk show host went on to proclaim, “I cannot reasonably argue that I own my
own face or name. And as much as I would like to have that guy on again, I
can’t.”3
While Stephen Colbert is just one example of an actor who decided to take
the high road and kill a character rather than face legal consequences, the
ordeal brought to light an area of copyright law that has a significant gap. This
gap mainly involves what happens when a character and an actor become so
inextricably linked that copyright may not provide sufficient protection. This
area of law is largely unexplored because most parties end up settling when a
legal issue arises. However, legal scholars have developed many theories
regarding how to manage character copyright control, which serves as the basis
for this Comment.
As our entertainment industry becomes much more personal with the
advent of reality TV, social media, satirical shows, and the like, it is harder for
consumers to differentiate between the real figures and the characters that they
portray. Characters are no longer purely fictional beings. The line between
reality and scripted television and film has become obliterated with shows like
The Hills4 and The Bachelor and The Bachelorette5 that construct personas for

1
Sarah K. Burris, Comedy Central Sues Stephen Colbert for Playing Himself on CBS: “I Do Not Own
My Face or Name,” RAWSTORY (July 28, 2016, 7:18 AM), http://www.rawstory.com/2016/07/comedy-centralsues-stephen-colbert-for-playing-himself-on-cbs-i-do-not-own-my-face-or-name/.
2
See The Colbert Report, COMEDY CENT., http://www.cc.com/shows/the-colbert-report (last visited
Oct. 2, 2016).
3
Burris, supra note 1. Viewers may wonder why the satire has continued even though “Stephen
Colbert” is Viacom’s intellectual property. The actor and corporate lawyers found a loophole that allows his
identical twin cousin, Stephen Colbert, to appear on air, by concocting a backstory: “[O]ur moms were
identical twins, who married identical twin husbands, then had sex at the exact same moment and gave us the
same name . . . this is my first appearance on television ever!” Id.
4
See Was “The Hills” Fake? Lauren Conrad Weighs In, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/16/was-the-hills-fake-lauren-conrad_n_1971118.html. Although the
show began as an intimate peek into the stars’ lives, Audrina Patridge explained, “[I]t kind of started
transitioning into being guided and manipulated and us kind of coming up with storylines and things.” Id.
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their casts. As the idea and the expression of the idea (i.e., the tangible
character) become nearly synonymous, as with Stephen Colbert and “Stephen
Colbert,” should copyright’s strict standards become more flexible to
recognize the persona–character in the entertainment industry?
At the highest level, protecting these persona–characters6 allows for more
creative and artistic expressions without fear of losing the rights to valuable
figures. Although many may not acknowledge it, entertainment is one of the
most important facets of modern life.7 Stripping actors of the right to use the
persona that they crafted increases the potential to stifle innovation and creates
a rigid environment in which emerging artists struggle to succeed. Because
copyright law is meant to encourage artists and promote creative expression,8
society will be at a detriment without some extended protections. It is
important to balance the competing interests between a copyright holder’s
investment with an actor’s rights to a character, particularly when it is nearly
impossible to sever the actor–character association. The reasons for solving
this problem go beyond protecting that singular actor’s investment: this
scenario also extends toward protecting established and emerging artists who
strive to make a name for themselves in the competitive entertainment
industry.
This Comment explores the following three questions that arise from this
tenacious problem. Where should we draw the line that severs the connection
between a character and an individual? Is this a spectrum of rights that can
shift depending on a character’s developmental stage? What are the
implications of utilizing merger as an affirmative defense and implementing a
limited-scope license to an actor? This Comment proposes that actors like
Stephen Colbert can use the merger doctrine in a limited scope, as a personal

5
See Jaclyn Hendricks, “The Bachelorette” Is All a Lie, N.Y. POST (July 22, 2015, 9:42 PM),
http://nypost.com/2015/07/22/the-bachelorette-is-all-a-lie/ (“Reality TV is so close to scripted TV at this
point . . . . It takes a sophisticated set of skills to be able to manipulate those emotions out of people.”).
6
This Comment seeks to limit its arguments to the protection of persona–characters. The use of
“persona–character,” “persona,” and “character” to describe the work that is inextricably linked to the actor
may be used interchangeably. For a discussion regarding the nuances, see infra Section I.B.
7
Ann C. Foster, Movies, Music, and Sports: U.S. Entertainment Spending, 2008–2013, BLS: BEYOND
NUMBERS, Mar. 25, 2015, at 1 (discussing how much the average American spends on entertainment annually,
resulting in an average annual spending of $2,482 in 2013).
8
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and
useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered.”).
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affirmative defense, to continue portraying persona–characters that are deeply
associated with their individual identities.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides background material
regarding the extent of copyright’s protection of characters in motion pictures
or television series. It begins by defining what a character is legally. Then, it
discusses what it means for a character to be copyrightable and whether a
character can be separated from the work as a whole, creating its own
protectable entity. Next, this Part discusses what happens when copyright
protection fails, specifically providing an in-depth examination of the merger
doctrine. Lastly, it addresses the potential for the right of publicity to displace
copyright when characters and actors become indistinguishable.
Part II identifies the tension between copyright and the right of publicity
regarding character ownership. First, this Part places characters on a spectrum,
from fully copyrightable to fully unprotected. The law is most unpredictable
when characters are placed in the middle of the spectrum, largely relating to
persona–characters. Second, it suggests a way to fill the gap by relying on the
underutilized merger doctrine as a personal affirmative defense.
Part III raises and negates possible objections to using the proposed merger
affirmative defense theory, highlighting two prominent alternatives for
handling control disputes. The first objection includes joint authorship credit
and the second objection includes claiming work made for hire.
Part IV suggests that the limited-scope merger essentially creates a royaltyfree license for an actor that can be incorporated contractually at the beginning
of character development. This Part concludes by highlighting how temporal
conditions and public perceptions can cause an actor and a character to merge
and unmerge throughout the life span. By recognizing the fluidity of a
character, protections can be extended appropriately while preserving the
quality of the expression.
I.

BACKGROUND

Movies and television shows are filled with classic characters—from
Superman to Dorothy to Harry Potter—that resonate deeply with the public for
various nostalgic reasons. Characters are not only important to the viewing
public, but are also invaluable assets to the studios and actors who bring them
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to life.9 The legal protection available to use a character in original and
derivative works depends on the strength of the character and its severability
from the actor. This Part examines the complexities of defining characters and
explains why characters are valuable assets to the person or entity that has
copyright ownership.
A. What Is a Character?
To understand what a character is in our complex entertainment world, it is
crucial to examine how the definition of “character” has evolved in recent
years from standard stock figures to amorphous persona–characters. At the
most basic level, the simple dictionary definition of a “character” includes “the
way someone thinks, feels, and behaves: someone’s personality” and “the
personality or part which an actor recreates.”10 The essence of all characters
ultimately boils down to an individual personality.
As character development begins, the creator must determine the level of
importance the character is to the story. This determination is critical for future
copyright claims. A major or central character is one that is “vital to the
development and resolution of the conflict,” while a minor character is one that
simply assists the major characters in the plot’s development.11 These
characters can be either static or dynamic and can be either flat or round.12
Characters that are more dynamic and round tend to be more memorable
because they “engage the reader’s imagination and empathy, making it

9
See generally Jeff MacGregor, Meet Lin-Manuel Miranda, the Genius Behind “Hamilton,”
Broadway’s Newest Hit, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/artsculture/lin-manuel-miranda-ingenuity-awards-180957234/. Although Lin Manuel Miranda was inspired to
create Hamilton based on the historical figure Alexander Hamilton, “[h]is secret is that he writes in service of
character, to advance story. . . . Without having to contrive event or fabricate plot he breathes life into history
and Alexander Hamilton, animates him, stands him up and makes him sing, makes him human for a couple of
hours.” Id. As of June 2016, the creation of these characters and this story earned Miranda $79.8 million in
ticket sales alone since opening night on Broadway, indicating the value that comes with creative
development. Valentina Sainato, Lin-Manuel Miranda Net Worth 2016: How Much Is Lin-Manuel Miranda
Worth Now?, COLLEGE CANDY (June 17, 2016, 3:04 AM), http://collegecandy.com/2016/06/17/lin-manuelmiranda-net-worth-how-much-is-lin-manuel-worth-money-broadway-hamilton-actor/.
10
Character, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/character (last visited
Oct. 31, 2016).
11
Types of Characters in Fiction, LEXICONIC, http://learn.lexiconic.net/characters.htm (last visited Oct.
31, 2016).
12
Id. A static character does not change in the course of the story, while a dynamic character does
change over time as a result of the plot’s events. Id. Similarly, a round character has a complex personality
featuring a range of emotions and thoughts to create depth, while a flat character has one basic and shallow
type of personality. Id.

ALTMAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

EVOLUTION OF ENTERTAINMENT EXPRESSIONS

4/23/2018 12:22 PM

741

possible for the reader to imagine him or herself in the character’s shoes.”13 In
other words, the more distinct, complex, and identifiable a character is, the
greater opportunity it has to resonate with the general public.14
Characters in fictional stories are easy to identify, as they used to and
continue to dominate all entertainment arenas. As one scholar explains, “A
fictional character’s unique identity can be imagined as occupying a position
along a delineation continuum ranging from vague idea to well-defined
individuality.”15 A fictional character has a novel name, a unique physical and
visual appearance, and distinctive mannerisms.16 Fictional characters exist in
all media forms. Literary characters are brought to life by an author’s use of
descriptive words paired with the imagination of a reader—a common example
is Harry Potter, “the boy who lived.”17 Motion picture characters are brought to
life by the words of a screenwriter and the mannerisms of an actor.18 For
example, Elle Woods is a fictional character who is not associated inherently
with Reese Witherspoon, the actor that portrays her, but instead is identifiable
as a peppy, blonde sorority girl turned law student.19
After defining what a character is, it is important to understand what a
character is not. A character is not a real-life person, for example, a historical
or prominent figure in a biography or documentary. While this seems intuitive,
it is necessary to state explicitly because of the ever-changing structure of our
entertainment world.
The prominence of social media and new forms of reality-based
entertainment have blurred the idea of what constitutes a character. Reality
television celebrities often claim that they are not actors and are simply

13
Ginny Wiehart, Learn About Round Characters in Fiction, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/
what-is-a-round-character-in-fiction-1277101 (last updated Nov. 12, 2017).
14
Id. Round characters are created by “employ[ing] a number of tools or elements . . . includ[ing]
description and dialogue. A character’s responses to conflict and his internal dialogue are also revelatory and
create a multi-dimensional character.” Id.
15
David B. Feldman, Comment, Finding a Home for Fictional Characters: A Proposal for Change in
Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 690 (1990).
16
See id.
17
See generally J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (1998). While Harry
Potter began as a literary character, he also was brought to life in film, giving the character an even more
defined place in popular culture.
18
See Stephen Clark, Of Mice, Men and Supermen: The Copyrightability of Graphic and Literary
Characters, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 959, 961 (1984) (“[P]ersonality traits and mannerisms . . . could be said to
make up the characters underlying the graphics.”).
19
See generally LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer July 13, 2001).
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inviting viewers to observe their real-life behavior.20 Under this classification,
they would not be characters. However, due to producer manipulation and a
desire for fame, many of these stars create their own persona, an intermediary
between a real person and a character.21 Constructive personas became
particularly clear when the cast of The Hills revealed how the fights, romance,
and overall conversations were all fake and heavily scripted.22 Although
Lauren Conrad, Heidi Montag, Audrina Patridge, and the rest of the cast
appeared to be real-world individuals, their television existence was nothing
more than “a constructed persona—in effect, a character.”23
Constructing personas helps reality stars, social media influencers, and
A-list celebrities to improve their brands and target specific audiences to
increase likeability.24 A persona is defined as “an individual’s social facade or
front that . . . reflects the role in life the individual is playing.”25 Similar to
reality stars’ personas, actors who play recurring roles, although not true
personas, create confusion in the minds of viewers simply because the
association between character and actor is hard to sever. When this occurs, the
actor “become[s] ‘inextricably identified’ with the role.”26 When an actor and a
character are inextricably linked, controversy arises regarding legal rights and
ownership.27

20

See Lindsay Korotkin, Note, Finding Reality in the Right of Publicity, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV.

DE

NOVO 268, 272 (2013).
21

See id. at 272–73.
See Was “The Hills” Fake? Lauren Conrad Weighs In, supra note 4. During the ten-year anniversary
special, secrets from production were revealed, including that “MTV would predict what plot lines would go
on, down to drama-filled stares across the room. Lauren called the scripts ‘super creepy.’” Neha Prakash, “The
Hills”: 9 Secrets We Learned from the 10-Year Anniversary Special, “That Was Then, This Is Now,” TEEN
VOGUE (Aug. 2, 2016, 10:05 PM), http://www.teenvogue.com/story/the-hills-that-was-then-this-is-nowsecrets.
23
See Korotkin, supra note 20, at 273 (emphasis omitted).
24
See Scott Huntington, Using Personas in Your Social Media Marketing, CHI. NOW: SMALLBIZBLOG
(Jan. 11, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.chicagonow.com/small-biz-blog/2017/01/using-personas-in-yoursocial-media-marketing/; see also John Brubaker, Grow Your Brand by Creating an Alter Ego,
ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/249456 (providing steps to develop
your own alter ego, including determining why you want an alter ego, figuring out the personality of your alter
ego, creating a distinct image, writing your alter ego’s origin story, picking a name, and being different from
your own identity).
25
Persona, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/persona (last visited Jan.
9, 2018).
26
Daniel Margolis, Note, Cheers to the Church Lady: Resolving the Conflict Between Copyright and
the Right of Publicity, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 627, 649 (1996).
27
See id. at 630–31. This article highlighted, in part, how Dana Carvey was so inextricably linked to the
Church Lady character that another actor would be unable to replace him, creating a severability problem and
potential copyright claim. See id. This is similar to Stephen Colbert’s non-severable character due to his
22
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B. What Is a Copyrightable Character?
A character’s copyrightability can be placed on a spectrum, from an
individual that is original and creative and guaranteed copyright protection, to
an individual that is deemed a stock figure and tossed into the public domain.28
Among the requirements for copyright are the elements of originality and
fixation;29 therefore, the more distinct the character is, the more likely it will
receive copyright.
Fictional characters that are original can sometimes be “distinctly
delineated” from the work as a whole.30 This means they are “uniquely
developed and novel in some way to be capable of copyright protection.”31
Animated or pictorial characters are the most susceptible to this classification
since they are brought to life through pictures rather than words or actions.32
Literary characters also have the ability to fall under this category, although it
is more difficult because they are brought to life solely by words.33 Because
the literary descriptions conjure up different images in the minds of different
readers, a character must be particularly distinct from the plot to be eligible for
copyright.34 Alternatively, a character in motion pictures can be distinct when

recurring persona on The Colbert Report, paired with the use of his real name and overall being. For a more indepth discussion of both scenarios, see infra Part II.
28
For a discussion about the public domain, see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965, 966–67, 975–77 (1990) (explaining that the public domain includes work created before the copyright
statutes were enacted, work covered in an expired copyright, and work unprotected from copyright such as
facts or ideas).
29
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
30
See Eric Lee, Note, Titan Sports, Inc. v. Hellwig: Wrestling with the Distinction Between Character
and Performer, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 155, 157 (2001).
31
Id. (citing Titan Sports, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 65, 68 (D. Conn. 1997)).
32
See generally Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2011)
(recognizing Betty Boop as a separate character copyright from the works in which she is featured); Warner
Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (considering a character’s physical attributes as
well as his attributes and traits in deciding whether the character is protectable); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that defendant infringed upon plaintiff’s copyrights in
the graphic images).
33
See Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal Problem, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 770–72 (2013); Jasmina Zecevic, Distinctly Delineated Fictional Characters That
Constitute the Story Being Told: Who Are They and Do They Deserve Independent Copyright Protection?, 8
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 365, 368–69 (2006).
34
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d. Cir 1930) (explaining that literary
characters that are distinct can be copyrighted, using Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night characters as an example);
Burroughs v. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that the character
Tarzan from the story Tarzan of the Apes was independently copyrightable from the work as a whole); see also
Said, supra note 33, at 770–72; Zecevic, supra note 33, at 368–69.

ALTMAN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

744

4/23/2018 12:22 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:735

the mannerisms, intonation, and overall characterization are severable from the
actor.35
If a character meets the distinctive prerequisite, it can be protectable under
copyright laws. Copyright law protects the tangible expression of an idea, not
the idea itself.36 The Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) provides a
detailed framework for the rights that authors of original creative works are
entitled to employ.37 Among these entitlements, authors have “exclusive rights
to reproduce, distribute, display, and perform their work, as well as the right to
make derivative works from their original.”38
Because the purpose of copyright law is to promote creativity and artistic
progress,39 a character is only eligible for a valid copyright if it is
independently distinct from the entire work as a protectable expressive
element.40 Characters can obtain a copyright independent of the work as a
whole if the character can satisfy one of two main tests: (1) the “distinctive
delineation test” or (2) the “constitutes the story being told test.”41
The first of these tests, the distinctive-delineation analysis, was derived by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.,42 a copyright infringement case. The court was tasked with determining,
in part, whether the defendant infringed upon the plaintiff’s characterization of
a Jewish woman and an Irish man’s romantic relationship.43 Ultimately, Judge
Learned Hand wrote the majority opinion stating, “It follows that the less
developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty
35
See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989) (holding that the Rocky characters were so highly developed that they earned copyright protection); see
also Benjamin A. Goldberger, How the “Summer of the Spinoff” Came to Be: The Branding of Characters in
American Mass Media, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301 (2003).
36
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (examining portability and profitability of fictional characters and how
reusing characters impacts protection standards and business strategies for entertainment conglomerates).
37
Id. §§ 101–805.
38
Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199,
202 (2002) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106).
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
ECONOMY 3, 6 (4th ed. 2015).
40
See J. Matthew Sharp, Note, The Reality of Reality Television: Understanding the Unique Nature of
the Reality Genre in Copyright Infringement Cases, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 177, 181 (2005).
41
Said, supra note 33, at 785 (first citing Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d
945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954); then citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)).
42
45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). The two plays that the court analyzed for infringement were the
plaintiff’s Abie’s Irish Rose and the defendant’s The Cohens and the Kellys. Id. Both stories revolved around a
Jewish family and an Irish family with star-crossed lovers. Id. However, one was a comedy and the other was a
drama. Id.
43
Id. at 121.
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an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”44 The court held that
the competing stories were different as to incident and character, and any
similarities between the two stories were solely based on ideas rather than
expressions; therefore, there was no copyright infringement.45
The second alternative test that courts use, the “constitutes the story being
told” analysis, originated in Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.,46 which involved a copyright assignment dispute related to the
original author’s character usage in subsequent works. In granting the author
the right to use the characters, the court explained, “It is conceivable that the
character really constitutes the story being told, but if the character is only the
chessman in the game of telling the story he is not within the area of the
protection afforded by the copyright.”47 Because the characters were essential
to tell the story, they were not included with the sale of the story.48 Essentially,
the characters were classified as distinct entities from the overarching story,
which allowed for the characters’ independence and continued use in
subsequent works.
The “constitutes the story being told” analysis was expanded to include the
protection of not only literary characters, but also cartoon characters in Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.49 The court held that Disney cartoon
characters warranted copyright protection because they are clear images
“which [have] physical as well as conceptual qualities, [and are] more likely to
contain some unique elements of expression.”50 In effect, this result could be
interpreted as limiting the language and reasoning in Warner Bros. Pictures
because the cartoon characters were protected regardless of whether they
“constitute the story being told.”51 Articulating the appropriate test regarding
severability and protectability impacts the way that a court decides its
outcome.

44

Id.
Id.
46
216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954). This case involved the copyright in “a mystery-detective story” called
The Maltese Falcon. Id. The facts regarding the assignment are beyond the scope of this Comment; therefore,
the discussion of the case will be limited to the copyrightability of the characters.
47
Id. at 950.
48
See id.
49
581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
50
Id. at 755.
51
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989
WL 206431, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
45
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These tests apply to literary and pictorial characters and their transferability
in media,52 but the tests can also apply to original characters in cinema.
Although not binding authority, the District Court for the Central District of
California in Anderson v. Stallone analyzed whether the Rocky characters
could be utilized in derivative cinematic works.53 The court noted that the
trilogy did not involve intricate plots and was mainly a character-driven
experience.54 Furthermore, the characters “were so highly developed and
central” to the story that they independently qualified for copyright protection
under both the “distinctive delineation” and the “constitutes the story being
told” tests.55
There are different thresholds depending on the artistic medium in which a
character originates. Therefore, courts specifically tend to focus on the
preliminary questions: “First, whether the character can be fixed in a tangible
medium of expression; and second, whether the character is considered a
‘work of authorship.’”56 Then they apply the pertinent test to determine
character copyrightability.
The importance of obtaining a viable copyright in a character is especially
relevant when understanding the value of derivative works. Section 106(2) of
the Copyright Act57 grants copyright holders the exclusive right to create
derivative works, “including translations, musical arrangements,
dramatizations, motion picture adaptations, sound recordings, and other forms
‘in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.’”58 The value in a
character copyright increases substantially with this exclusive right because the
copyright owner has the ability to control future use, the exclusivity to license
out the character or to sue for its infringement, and the chance to profit from
merchandising opportunities.59
Because these exclusive rights are valuable to the copyright owner, the
entity funding the development of a character will seek all legal ownership.
52

See Said, supra note 33, at 785–86.
1989 WL 206431, at *6.
54
Id. at *8.
55
Id. at *7–8.
56
Margolis, supra note 26, at 639 (footnote omitted) (first citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995); then quoting
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995)). This article went on to explain that motion picture characters are considered an
appropriate copyright subject matter because the culmination of work from all different sources is sufficiently
qualified as an original work of authorship. Id. at 640.
57
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012).
58
Rothman, supra note 38, at 209 n.31 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002)).
59
See Margolis, supra note 26, at 637–38; see also Rothman, supra note 38, at 210; Feldman, supra
note 15, at 687–88.
53
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Traditionally, an actor depicting a character or an individual constructing a
persona does not have copyright over the character that he portrays due to the
“work made for hire” doctrine,60 which relinquishes control of a character to
the financial entity supporting the production.61 Unless there is the potential for
joint authorship between an actor and a studio, the studio will likely own the
copyright via contract.62 These contractual limitations affect an actor’s
capacity to benefit from a character whose copyright is vested with a studio.
Studio ownership means that an actor who is linked to a character cannot
continue to use it in subsequent productions. Because some characters are not
impactful without the actor’s personification, a loophole is required to salvage
characters from rotting on archive shelves.
C. Limitations on Copyright Protection for a Character
Although copyright holders hope that their copyright protection is
unwavering, a loophole exists that could relinquish some control of
inextricably linked persona–characters. The expression of an idea is
protectable under copyright law,63 but what happens when copyright is not
applicable to a particular character? There is “a corollary maxim that even
expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one or so few
ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effectively
accord protection to the idea itself.”64 This is better known as the merger
doctrine.
The merger doctrine balances the competing interests of promoting
creative expression with the public interest in the free flow of information and
ideas.65 Merger arguments arise frequently as a copyright infringement defense
and, if successful, ultimately rescind copyright protection.66 However, courts
60
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining the “work made for hire” doctrine). For a more detailed
analysis of the doctrine, see infra Section IV.B.
61
Margolis, supra note 26, at 643 (“[W]hen a character is not written for a specific actor and would not
change dramatically if the actor were replaced, the actor’s contribution does not deserve copyright protection
as a work of authorship.”).
62
Id. For further discussion about joint authorship, see infra Section IV.A.
63
17 U.S.C. § 102.
64
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
65
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F. 3d 791, 802 (5th Cir. 2002).
66
See Scott Abrahamson, Comment, Seen One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the Copyright Merger
Doctrine, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1126–27 (1998). In a copyright infringement case, a copyright holder must
show proof of a valid copyright and demonstrate infringement of protected elements. Sony Pictures Entm’t,
Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t Grp., Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1155–56 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“In other words, it is
only copying of copyrightable elements of a plaintiff’s work that is answerable under the federal Copyright
Act.”). Infringement requires a showing of at least substantial similarity, which “refers to similarity of
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differ regarding the consequence of a successful merger argument—some
believe that the copyright as to that particular element is invalid while others
say there is no copyright at all.67 Other courts treat merger as an affirmative
defense, allowing that particular defendant to use that expression, but not
finding the work as a whole ineligible for copyright.68
Because of the potential severity of the consequences of using the merger
doctrine, courts are apprehensive to apply the doctrine unless a defendant’s
showing of merger is obvious.69 Typically courts look at the similarities
between a plaintiff’s and defendant’s work to determine, somewhat arbitrarily,
whether the idea and expression are so intertwined as to make the defendant’s
work not a copy, but rather a use of a generic concept.70 To differentiate
between an idea and an expression, one scholar explained:
An idea is a thought, a mental conception or image. When
“expression” is an abstraction, it is of the same nature as an idea.
The difference is one of degree, not of type. In this area,
copyrights approach “what may be called the metaphysics of the
law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle and
refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”71
Because the line between idea and expression is amorphous, merger should
be used sparingly but appropriately. Although copyright promotes creativity,
merger is necessary to allow individuals to use expressions that otherwise have
limited means of display.72 This concept is comparable to scènes à faire, in

expression, not merely similarity of ideas or concepts.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
109 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
67
Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc. 79 F.3d 1532, 1546 n.28 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Compatibility and other
functionality challenges to originality . . . are applied so as to deny copyright protection to a particular work or
portion of a work.” (emphasis added)); see also COHEN ET AL., supra note 39, at 96–97.
68
COHEN ET AL., supra note 39, at 96–97. This Comment will focus on using the merger doctrine in its
capacity as an affirmative defense to accomplish the favorable policies of allowing actors to use the characters
they invest in and allowing studios to profit from the characters’ continued use.
69
See Abrahamson, supra note 66, at 1146.
70
See id. at 1134 (“[A]pplication of the doctrine of an idea merging with its expression depend[ed] on
the level of abstraction at which the idea is formulated.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991))). The article explains how the abstraction test was
formulated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), to describe the difficulty
in finding the line between idea and expression. Abrahamson, supra note 66, at 1134.
71
Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 85 (1989) (footnote
omitted) (first citing WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 901 (2d ed.1983); then quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
72
See Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1221, 1223 (1993); Said, supra note 33, at 782 (“[I]f a particular work consists of expression that would
otherwise be protected, the merger doctrine prevents its copyrightability if the expression is one of a very
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which generic elements and details of a scene are not protectable under
copyright law.73 Two types of scènes à faire are recognized by courts today:
(1) scenes that must be included to depict specific situations and (2) scenes that
are standard or stock.74
The doctrine of scènes à faire seeks to promote artistic expression by
allowing these generic devices to be used in new original works. A line of
cases from the District Court for the Southern District of New York helps
illustrate this concept. First, in Hogan v. DC Comics, the court compared the
plaintiff’s unpublished comic book with the defendant’s painted novel, both
featuring the struggles of a half-vampire, half-human protagonist.75 The court
found that most of the similarities rendered the ideas and themes unprotected.76
Second, in 2011, the court decided DiTocco v. Riordan, a case in which the
plaintiff and defendant both crafted stories around a quest to get Zeus his
signature lightning bolt.77 Here, the court noted that the threshold for
substantial similarity is high for character traits and held that while the
characters in the two stories had similar qualities, the similarities were not
copyrightable.78 Furthermore, the court noted that Zeus and other mythologybased characters are stock figures in many cultures and need to be available to
the general public.79 These cases illustrate a roadblock in copyright protection
for creative tools.
Scènes à faire does not just guarantee that general themes are publicly
available, but also ensures that universal archetypes for characters are
accessible.80 However, merger is not as broad as scènes à faire. Depending on
limited number of ways an idea may be expressed.” (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740
F. Supp. 37, 58–59 (D. Mass. 1990))).
73
See Kurtz, supra note 71, at 80.
74
See id. at 81; see also Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defining scènes à
faire as “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in
the treatment of a given topic”).
75
48 F. Supp. 2d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
76
Id. at 309–10 (“[I]n comparing two works a court must determine ‘whether the similarities shared by
the works are something more than mere generalized idea[s] or themes.’ The works must share a similarity of
expression, such as ‘similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events, and characterization,’ or a similarity in
their ‘total concept and feel.’” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Walker v. Time
Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48–49 (2d Cir. 1986); then quoting Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop,
533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976); and then quoting Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1996))).
77
815 F. Supp. 2d 655 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
78
Id. at 668 (“These stock characters are not copyrightable: heroes frequently have sidekicks, and
teenage boys frequently pursue girls of the blond, popular, and athletic variety. In any event, these sidekicks
and love interests bear scant resemblance to their counterparts.”).
79
Id. at 669.
80
Said, supra note 33, at 782; see also Kurtz, supra note 71, at 81.
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the court’s interpretation of merger, the court can either toss characters to the
public81 (along the lines of scènes à faire) or it can deem certain characteristics
uncopyrightable.82 Simply speaking, generic characters are placed into the
public domain and may be manipulated for the common benefit, facilitating
more artistic, imaginative works. A classic example involves the use of the
“ditzy blonde” as a generic archetype that evolves into iconic and distinctive
characters such as Elle Woods,83 Cher Horowitz,84 or Phoebe Buffay.85
Courts are responsible for drawing the line between what constitutes an
idea and what constitutes an expression.86 There are several tests that courts
can employ to determine whether elements are generic expressions or original
expressions, namely the abstraction test,87 the pattern test,88 the dissection
test,89 and the “total concept and feel” test.90 The outcomes will inevitably vary

81
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
merger doctrine prevented Yankee Candle from holding copyright in its labels; therefore, competitors were
free to use the same subject matter on its labels).
82
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In order to
effectuate the purposes behind the copyright laws, it is also appropriate to apply the doctrines of merger and
scenes a faire to filter out unprotectable elements.”).
83
See generally LEGALLY BLONDE, supra note 19.
84
See generally CLUELESS (Paramount Pictures July 19, 1995).
85
See generally Friends (Warner Bros. Television 1994–2004).
86
See Said, supra note 33, at 785.
87
Sharp, supra note 40, at 184 (“The abstraction test states that the television show should be broken
apart into increasingly general levels of abstraction.” (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930))); see also Said, supra note 33, at 785 (first citing Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954); then citing Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121) (highlighting the
cases that developed the character copyright tests).
88
Sharp, supra note 40, at 185 (“The pattern test seeks to divide the show into a list of expressive
elements. From those elements, a pattern is discerned. Any show where this pattern is too similar to another
will have infringed upon the expression of the original show.” (footnotes omitted)).
89
Id. (“The dissection test seeks to separate the protected from the unprotected elements, the expression
from the idea. There can only be infringement where the protected elements have been copied.” (footnotes
omitted)).
90
Id. at 185–86 (“The total concept and feel test does not seek to distinguish between protected and
unprotected elements. Rather, it looks at both the underlying idea and the manner in which that idea is
expressed to determine if one show is substantially similar to another.” (footnotes omitted)). See generally
Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (looking intrinsically through the perception of
children, the court held that a reasonable observer would not infer that the defendant’s dolls captured the total
concept and feel of the plaintiff’s designs); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the movie E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial did not infringe upon the musical play Lokey from Maldemar because
there was no substantial similarity between the protectable elements of the works); Warner Bros. v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (“In determining whether a character in a second work infringes
a cartoon character, courts have generally considered not only the visual resemblance but also the totality of
the characters’ attributes and traits.”); Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 776–77 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that
although the book and the motion picture have similar themes, there are substantial deviations regarding the
idea developments in both works so the total concept and feel of the works are substantially dissimilar).
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depending on which test is used. The “total concept and feel” test is applied
most often for merger issues because the idea and expression are analyzed as
interrelated concepts.91 Merger should be a constant consideration when
assessing whether an expression is actually protectable.
D. The Right of Publicity
In situations that are similar to Stephen Colbert’s—when an actor’s name,
ideas, and physical appearance are the same as those of the character he
represented—the character and actor become inextricably linked. When this
happens, the copyrightable character is associated with the individual actor
rather than as just a mere character. At this point, when the connection is not
neatly severable, the right-of-publicity doctrine—which sounds in tort rather
than copyright—comes to the forefront, acting as another potential limitation
to perpetuate the use of a character.
While copyright law protects inventive expressions and is federally
recognized, the right of publicity aims to protect the individual behind the
character and is a state law tort that varies among jurisdictions.92 Because the
right is not federally recognized, courts determine case outcomes through state
statutes and common law precedent, leading to inconsistent and unpredictable
judgments.93 Generally the right permits an individual to prohibit others from
using his name, likeness, persona, or voice for commercial purposes.94 To take
advantage of the right of publicity, at least one of the following types of
misappropriation must be satisfied: “1) appropriation of one’s name or likeness
for advertising or endorsement; 2) unauthorized use of one’s name or likeness
on commercial products; 3) appropriation of one’s unique style or
characteristics; and 4) appropriation of one’s performance.”95 Although this
right can apply to any person, celebrities frequently contest it because they

91
See Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901–02; Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357; Warner Bros., 720 F. 2d at 241; Jason,
526 F. Supp. at 776–77.
92
Rothman, supra note 38, at 202.
93
Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or Public Domain?, 19
NOVA L. REV. 1013, 1015, 1017 (1995).
94
Rothman, supra note 38, at 202 (first citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46
(AM. LAW INST. 1995); then citing 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3.1
(2d ed. 2000)); see also Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
that Johnny Carson’s “Here’s Johnny” catchphrase was identifiable enough to cause his right of publicity to be
infringed upon when it was used as a slogan for portable toilets, which established that a celebrity’s right of
publicity can be infringed even if the celebrity’s name or likeness is not used).
95
Spahn, supra note 93, at 1016.
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have significant profits to lose if anyone can commercially exploit their
likeness.96
In recognizing this right and the privacy interest at stake, there is the
potential that the right of publicity can supersede copyright, which can create
significant problems in intellectual property law.97 These problems manifest
when an actor asserts right-of-publicity control over a copyrightable character
that is also inextricably linked to the actor’s personal identity, as best
illustrated by two seminal cases, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures98 and
McFarland v. Miller.99
In Lugosi, the heirs of the famous actor Bela Lugosi—who acted as the
most emulated portrayal of Dracula—sued Universal Pictures for using his
characteristics and likeness as Count Dracula in subsequent merchandising
opportunities.100 Although this case has since been superseded by California
statute, the California Supreme Court’s debate still remains relevant:
Justice Mosk opined that an actor may only possess a proprietary
interest in an “original creation” played by its “creator,” as
opposed to Chief Justice Bird’s assertion that the right of
publicity should extend to appropriations of the actor’s likeness in
his or her portrayal of a fictional character because the portrayals
of the characters “may well be considerably more important than
protection for the individual’s ‘natural’ appearance.”101
Lugosi stands as a testament to the many ways that the right of publicity can be
interpreted, namely as a property right, privacy right, work product, or
copyright.102
While the value of a fictional character was addressed in Lugosi, the value
of a persona was recognized in McFarland v. Miller,103 a seminal development
96

See Rothman, supra note 38, at 202–04.
Peter K. Yu, Note, Fictional Persona Test: Copyright Preemption in Human Audiovisual Characters,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 355, 366–67 (1998) (discussing fictional personas and human personas and whether they
are protected under the Copyright Act or the right of publicity). The problem of copyright preemption over the
right to publicity is beyond the scope of this Comment and involves an analysis of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution. For background on the Supremacy Clause, see generally U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2.
98
603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
99
14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
100
603 P.2d at 427.
101
Angela D. Cook, Note, Should Right of Publicity Protection Be Extended to Actors in the Characters
Which They Portray, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 309, 317 n.34 (1999) (citations omitted) (first quoting
Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431 (Mosk, J., concurring); then quoting id. at 445 (Bird, J., dissenting)).
102
For an in-depth explanation on each of these proposals, see Spahn, supra note 93, at 1022–27.
97
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in right-of-publicity jurisprudence. In McFarland, a restaurant owner was sued
for naming his restaurant after a character named “Spanky” in the television
show Our Gang (later known as the Little Rascals).104 Not only did the
restaurant owner name the restaurant “Spanky McFarland’s,” but he also
displayed memorabilia from the series, perpetuating the unauthorized use of
the character.105 Although the initial contract between the actor and the studio
relinquished the actor’s control over everything but the name of the character,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a material issue of fact
existed over who had the right to the character based on the associational
element.106 The court reasoned that while originality plays a role, “[w]here an
actor’s screen persona becomes so associated with him that it becomes
inseparable from the actor’s own public image, the actor obtains an interest in
the image which gives him standing to prevent mere interlopers from using it
without authority.”107
Characters overlap with the actors who develop them at a more frequent
pace in the present entertainment industry, allowing for more right-of-publicity
cases to potentially arise. The goal of bringing these issues to light is to protect
the actor’s investment in a character from whom they are entitled to profit.108
While right-of-publicity jurisprudence is somewhat unpredictable, it is useful
to recognize how associational rights could impact character copyright
disputes.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN
CHARACTER PROTECTION AND WAYS TO FILL THE GAP
Characters continue to evolve throughout entertainment history, leading to
the occasional overlap of copyright and the right of publicity and creating
tension about which doctrine controls disputes. Gap-filling measures can help
ease this tension. Utilizing the competing legal doctrines that govern characters
in the entertainment industry, this Part places characters and expressions on a
spectrum to demonstrate how copyright protection changes as associations
advance. It seeks to explain what happens when the line is blurred and the
character is no longer distinct from the actor bringing him to life. This Part
103

14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 914.
105
Id. at 916.
106
See id. at 921.
107
Id. at 920.
108
This Comment mostly refers to copyright’s role in the character spectrum, but for an in-depth
understanding of the right to publicity’s role in the spectrum, see Cook, supra note 101, at 315–17, 317 n.34.
104
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suggests that when the overlap occurs, the merger doctrine can fill the legal
gap to allow the characters to continue to be used by their living counterparts.
A. The Character Spectrum and the Rights Associated with Persona
Protection
Characters are more fluid now than ever. On one end of the character
spectrum lies the fully copyrightable character that is guaranteed full
protection under federal law.109 At the opposite end of the character spectrum,
there is the living, breathing person who exists onscreen in biographies or
documentaries, appearing in his individual capacity, undisputedly not as a
character.110 In the second situation, the character takes on more of a news,
rather than entertainment, value.111 The gray area exists in the middle of the
spectrum where typecast characters, reality-star constructed personas, and
characters inextricably linked to actors dominate entertainment channels. The
gray area is particularly important to focus on because no clear solution
currently exists that allows both the studio and the actor to benefit.
Traditionally, copyright law protects characters; however, when the
association reaches the middle ground, as discussed above, the law is unclear
as to when the actor can gain right-of-publicity access to the character.112 “At
its heart, the value of the right of publicity is associational. People link the
person with the items the person endorses and, if that person is famous, that
link has value.”113 Because of this link, the courts appear to recognize persona
rights: “Under current right of publicity precedents, an individual actor, athlete,
or singer can sue the owner of a restaurant, bar, or store that shows her
performance for a violation of her right of publicity with a good chance of
prevailing.”114

109

See supra Section I.B.
See Ryan Westerman, Comment, As Seen on TV: Your Compromising Cameo on National Reality
Programming, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 403, 412–13 (2013).
111
See id. (highlighting the case Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011), which explains
that a person who was pulled over and recorded for a TV series was not entitled to protection due to the
newsworthiness of the appearance).
112
See supra Section I.D.
113
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the actor was so inextricably linked with the character as to warrant right-ofpublicity protection).
114
Rothman, supra note 38, at 217; see also Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that robots modeled after the actors’ characters presented material issues of fact with regard to the
right of publicity); McFarland, 14 F.3d at 914 (holding that the right of publicity extended to a character who
was inextricably linked to the actor); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
110
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Certain states allow the coverage of personas under the right of publicity,
which protects the idea of a person.115 If this view of persona is accepted, then
allowing protection “contravenes the Copyright Act’s explicit grant of ideas to
the public.”116 But, a persona can also be a performance and character creation,
as indicated by the admissions of reality television celebrities.117 This
classification could change the remedies available to the actor, further blurring
the line between which intellectual property doctrine applies.
Classification along this spectrum is important because the individual and
the character differ in regard to the types of protections each may receive.118
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began to analyze the overlap in
intellectual property doctrines in the case Wendt v. Host International, Inc.119
John Ratzenberger and George Wendt, the actors behind the iconic Cheers
characters Cliff Clavin and Norm Peterson, respectively, sued Host
International for opening up a chain of airport bars that featured animatronic
robots based on the characters.120 The animatronics were considered a
derivative work of the original copyright, which traditionally would be at the
discretion of the copyright holder.121 However, the court held that there was a
likelihood of confusion between the characters and the animatronic robots
because the robots embodied the persona of the characters.122 Based on this
decision, the court established a precedent that actors who are heavily
identified with their characters potentially have rights that supersede
copyright.123

1983) (holding that Johnny Carson’s right of publicity was affected when a port-a-potty company used “Here’s
Johnny” as their slogan to take advantage of Carson’s recognition).
115
Rothman, supra note 38, at 223.
116
Id. at 224 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002)).
117
See Was “The Hills” Fake? Lauren Conrad Weighs In, supra note 4; supra notes 20–23 and
accompanying text.
118
See Westerman, supra note 112, at 412–13 (citing Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill.
2011), in which the court ruled that the individual who was arrested and displayed on reality television without
written consent was not entitled to protection because the public concern outweighs the individual’s right to
publicity); supra Section I.B.
119
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
120
Id. at 809.
121
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2012); Rothman, supra note 38, at 210–11.
122
Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812–14; see also Rothman, supra note 38, at 211 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s holding
in Wendt demonstrates the current legal view that right of publicity claims are not preempted by copyright law
even when they prevent the creation of authorized derivative works.”).
123
The Ninth Circuit’s holding caused some controversy amongst copyright scholars. See Rothman,
supra note 38, at 202 (explaining that this decision could affect merchandising rights and creative potential for
subsequent works).
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Wendt presented that courts are willing to recognize persona protection for
characters and actors. But what happens when the actor plays a substantial role
in creating a character, so much so that the character can only be rightfully
played by that one actor? Prior to Colbert’s ordeal, Dana Carvey, a comedian
and former Saturday Night Live (SNL) cast member, faced a similar problem
with his character the “Church Lady.”124 In 1996, Carvey attempted to use the
Church Lady on his prime-time comedy show.125 NBC interfered and said that
the Church Lady was its intellectual property and could not be played by
Carvey outside of the network.126 Choosing to relinquish control of the
character, Carvey announced on his show that the Church Lady would be
replaced by her gay nephew who is very similar—“I can play the relatives, but
not the characters.”127
While this case was not litigated, it revealed the lack of protection for
actors who help create a character and, under current precedent, are unable to
continue using it personally. The Church Lady likely would not have been as
big of a success or as identifiable of a character had it not been for Carvey’s
characterization. By denying the actor any right in the persona–character, a
long-term problem relating to diminished incentive to create could arise if the
rewards are minimal for substantial developmental investment.
Persona–character protection should be granted when the persona is an
extension of the actor, such that they bear the same name, same mannerisms,
and same look.128 “When an actor plays himself or herself as a character, the
character shares the actor’s identity. Therefore, these situations present the
strongest argument for right of publicity’s extension to cases of character
misappropriation.”129 This is where the largely unexplored territory lies—
124
See Margolis, supra note 26, at 630; Catrina Dennis, “SNL”: Watch Dana Carvey Return as Church
Lady to Rant About Election: “Jesus Is Not on the Ballot,” WRAP (Nov. 5, 2016, 10:36 PM), http://www.
thewrap.com/snl-watch-dana-carvey-return-church-lady-rant-election-jesus-not-ballot-video/. The Church
Lady made her debut in 1986 and was a regular character on the hit show until 1990. Dennis, supra. The
character is an opinionated Catholic grandmother figure who preaches her conservative ways, utilizes distinct
catchphrases, and breaks into song. Id. Carvey was the only actor to portray the character. Id. He continues to
make random appearances in character on SNL. Id.
125
Margolis, supra note 26, at 630; see also Associated Press, Dana Carvey to Bring Out “Church
Lady’s” Kin, TULSA WORLD (Mar. 4, 1996, 12:00 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/archives/dana-carvey-tobring-out-church-lady-s-kin/article_79eadb24-7c7b-5384-8b7d-9e6dfbe14768.html (last updated Sept. 20,
2013, 12:10 AM).
126
Margolis, supra note 26, at 630.
127
Associated Press, supra note 125.
128
Yu, supra note 97, at 408 (proposing a “fictional persona” test in which courts decide copyright
preemption issues by assessing whether “an average lay observer can recognize from the audiovisual character
a personality that is substantially different from the actor’s human persona”).
129
Cook, supra note 101, at 315.
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Stephen Colbert being the most recent example. Promoting artistic expression
is a fundamental American value that should be encouraged, particularly when
one particular actor is the only person who could do justice to a specific
character.
B. Utilizing Merger to Fill the Spectrum’s Gray Area
In complex cases in which the right of publicity and copyright overlap on
the character spectrum, namely when persona–characters are represented, the
most effective resolution to the conflict is to utilize merger in the personal
affirmative defense context. Because copyright’s overarching purpose is to
promote creativity so authors can enrich the public with new works, the merger
doctrine would allow a character, such as Stephen Colbert or the Church Lady,
to be used by the actor in addition to the studio or network.130 By focusing on
the affirmative defense purpose of merger, a studio’s interests can still be
protected because its investment is safe from entering the public domain and
the copyright’s extension to the actor would be non-transferrable with a finite
set of rights.
Copyright protection was once very clear: there had to be a literal copying
of a copyrighted work for there to be an infringement.131 But, with the
expansion of copyright, there is less room for subsequent authors to be inspired
by predecessors.132 By arguing that the expression can take only a limited
number of forms, actors that play characters in the gray area of the spectrum
can argue merger to reclaim the persona–character for future personal use.133 If
the actor wins based on the affirmative defense, “there is no ‘monopoly over
the unparticularized expression of an idea at such a level of abstraction or
generality as unduly to inhibit independent creation by others.’”134 For this
defense to work appropriately, the “independent creation by others” should
only extend to the one actor to ensure that studios do not lose all copyright and
continue to invest in future creative works without the fear that any individual
can claim a right to the expression.
Characters today take many different shapes and forms, exposing an issue
that likely was not contemplated when the Copyright Act was adopted.135 The

130
131
132
133
134
135

See Kurtz, supra note 72, at 1223.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227–28.
Id. at 1233, 1243.
Id. at 1243 (quoting Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int’l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
See supra Section I.A.
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public’s association between characters and actors overlaps frequently. If this
occurs, then the idea and the expression would not be severable, and merger
would force the copyright to be extended.136 When a character and an actor
conjure up the same image in the public’s mind, the expression of the idea can
only take that specific form.
For example, if Stephen Colbert’s case had been litigated, he could have
asserted merger as his personal affirmative defense. The idea (a satirical news
anchor) and the expression of the idea (the character Stephen Colbert) can take
limited forms because Stephen Colbert (the actor) is the only person who
conjures up this character in the public’s mind.137 Although actors try to get
around the studio’s control by reinventing the character slightly,138 merger is
the best defense available to save, rather than archive, the original character.
This solution would allow (1) the actor to benefit from his labor of developing
a persona–character, (2) the studio to benefit from still holding the copyright,
and (3) the public to benefit from continuing to hear new commentary on the
current state of national and international affairs from a beloved character.
Another example of merger’s necessity is based on the popularity of the
Church Lady’s cameos on SNL. In May 2016, she returned to SNL and
garnered over 2.5 million views on YouTube,139 and then reprised her role in
November 2016 and earned over 1.5 million views on YouTube.140 Not only
does the large number of YouTube views explain her popularity, but the
millions who tuned in to watch the sketches live also attest to her place in pop
culture.141 Because Carvey is the only person who can properly convey this
136
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Some
ideas admit of only a limited number of expressions. When there is essentially only one way to express an
idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that expression. [Even
w]hen the idea and its expression are not completely inseparable, there may still be only a limited number of
ways of expressing the idea.” (citations omitted)).
137
See Brian Steinberg, Viacom Wishes the Real Stephen Colbert Would Leave the Old Stephen Colbert
Alone, VARIETY (July 28, 2016, 10:22 AM), http://variety.com/2016/tv/news/stephen-colbert-late-showviacom-cbs-1201825647/; see also Eriq Gardner, Can Viacom Really Stop Stephen Colbert from Playing
“Stephen Colbert?,” HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 28, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/can-viacom-stop-stephen-colbert-915340.
138
Steinberg, supra note 137.
139
Saturday Night Live, Church Lady Cold Open – SNL, YOUTUBE (May 8, 2016),
https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=YHyW0N5f7zQ.
140
Saturday Night Live, Weekend Update: Church Lady on the Election – SNL, YOUTUBE (Nov. 6,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5JK-en8kW8.
141
Nellie Andreeva, “Saturday Night Live” Ratings Stay Strong with Host Benedict Cumberbatch on
Eve of Elections, DEADLINE (Nov. 6, 2016, 10:35 AM), http://deadline.com/2016/11/saturday-night-liveratings-benadict-cumberbatch-1201849713/.
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character, by allowing the idea (an outspoken, devout church lady) to merge
with the expression (Carvey’s characterization of the Church Lady), the public
benefits from the perpetuation of the character in entertainment.
Although these are just two examples of ways that a character and an actor
can become inextricably linked, they emphasize why the merger doctrine needs
to be utilized more in copyright law. This prescription would achieve three key
goals. First, it allows studios to invest in characters without fear of giving up
all control in litigious battles. This, in turn, establishes credibility for the
studio’s reputation by showing empathy toward its employees. Second, it
allows actors to work without fear that their contributions will be undervalued,
thereby establishing a more creative environment. Third, it allows the public to
witness the continued existence of its favorite characters in the entertainment
world. Essentially, everyone involved in the creative process benefits through
promoting the limited-scope merger.
III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO USING THE MERGER DOCTRINE
While merger can be the solution to filling copyright’s gap in persona–
character protection, courts are hesitant to rely on the merger doctrine, fearing
that excessive use will stifle creativity.142 This reluctance often results in courts
relying on old solutions, namely joint authorship and work made for hire.143
However, joint authorship and work made for hire require specificity that may
fill only part of the gap.144 This Part explores the objections and explains why
merger is either better or necessary to protect personas.
A. Joint Authorship to Allow for Equal Ownership
Authorship is a copyright requirement that is used to establish who actually
owns the copyrighted material with the ability to benefit from the property’s
commercial value.145 “The Copyright Act recognizes three different types of
142

See Abrahamson, supra note 68, at 1147; supra Section I.C.
See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1015
(2015) (arguing that courts use a rigid system to determine authorship in collaborative works including joint
authorship or work-made-for-hire doctrines).
144
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (describing the statutory requirements for work made for hire); id. § 106
(describing the default rules of joint authorship); see also Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 143, at 1030
(“[E]very time a work results from multiple contributions that are not otherwise covered by the work-madefor-hire and joint authorship doctrines, the work is prima facie a collective work, covered by many copyrights,
with only a limited copyright for the organizer.” (citing § 101)).
145
See 17 U.S.C. § 102; Teresa Huang, Note, Gaiman v. McFarlane: The Right Step in Determining
Joint Authorship for Copyrighted Material, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 673, 675 (2005) (explaining that if joint
authorship is achieved, it affords the authors equal rights in exploiting, copying, or licensing the work).
143
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authorship: sole authorship, joint or co-authorship, and employer
authorship . . . .”146 Authorship belongs to anyone who was the originator of a
work—the person who created the piece from its origin.147 In the context of
persona–characters, the important determination is whether joint authorship
would apply in situations in which the actor contributed to a character enough
to make the two inextricably linked.
The requirements for what qualifies as a joint authorship are highly
contested. To begin with, the Copyright Act does not clearly define the
threshold for joint authorship credit, solely choosing to define what constitutes
a joint work—“a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.”148 The statutory language creates the following elements: “(1)
[A] copyrightable work, (2) two or more ‘authors,’ and (3) the authors must
intend their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole.”149 The disagreement regarding character copyrightability
involves having the proper intent at the time of the work’s creation.150
Having the requisite intent is a fact-intensive inquiry that can lead to
inadvertent results. A classic example of joint authorship miscommunication
was in Aalmuhammed v. Lee,151 when the Ninth Circuit analyzed several cases
to determine criteria for joint-authorship intent.152 This case involved the

146

COHEN, ET AL., supra note 39, at 137; see 17 U.S.C. § 201.
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (“So, also,
no one would now claim that the word writing in this clause of the Constitution, though the only word used as
to subjects in regard to which authors are to be secured, is limited to the actual script of the author, and
excludes books and all other printed matter.”); see also Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir.
2000) (“In a movie this definition, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, would generally limit
authorship to someone at the top of the screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the director,
possibly the star, or the screenwriter—someone who has artistic control.”).
148
17 U.S.C. § 101; Huang, supra note 145, at 673.
149
Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1231 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 101).
150
This Part assumes that the character met the standards listed in Section I.B. and qualifies for
copyright. This Part focuses on intent because the debate over control, if litigated, would come down to this
issue.
151
202 F.3d 1227, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 2000).
152
Id.; see also Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a contributing playwright
for Rent was not considered a coauthor because the scriptwriter never manifested his intent for coauthorship);
Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the actors were unable to identify
copyrightable contributions to the work and were not joint authors); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.
1991) (rejecting joint authorship because the plaintiff’s contributions were based on facts and research which
were not copyrightable material and she never intended to be a coauthor). See generally Huang, supra note
145, at 678–79, 678 n.35 (proving that these cases were based on Professor Goldstein’s copyrightability test,
which highlights intention to coauthor and the contribution of separately copyrightable materials).
147
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movie Malcolm X based on the novel The Autobiography of Malcolm X.153 The
plaintiff was asked to consult on the film because he had special knowledge
regarding Muslim culture and Malcolm X himself.154 He changed scenes and
lines to make the production more accurate and wanted joint-authorship credit
for his contributions.155 The court denied joint-authorship credit due to the lack
of intent, supported by the Ninth Circuit’s test that requires both parties
“‘superintend[]’ the work by exercising control” and make manifestations of
their shared intent to be coauthors, and that “the audience appeal of the work
turn[] on both contributions and ‘the share of each in its success cannot be
appraised.’”156 Essentially, to be joint authors, both individuals need to be
aware that their contributions are going toward a singular, copyrightable work
at the beginning of the partnership.
If control and intent are the most important standards with which joint
authorship is gauged, then characters would seemingly be an easy battle to win
for the studio. This is largely because the studio would be the one that actually
created the show and the characters. At its inception, an actor would not have
had control of a character. While he may have intent to be a coauthor, it likely
would not be shared intent.
But the decision in Gaiman v. McFarlane157 changed the joint-authorship
analysis. The defendant published a comic book series and later asked the
plaintiff to write editions of the series without explicit mention of work made
for hire.158 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit modified existing law
and held that coauthorship does not require that each contribution be
copyrightable if intent to create a copyrightable end product existed.159
Therefore, “the expression of the merged ideas of all the contributors in a
fixed, tangible medium” is the protectable product.160
153

Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1229.
Id.
155
Id. at 1230.
156
Id. at 1234 (footnote omitted) (first quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
61 (1884); then citing Thomas, 147 F.3d at 202; and then quoting Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1994)) (noting that control is the most important factor).
157
360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
158
Id. at 649–50.
159
Id. at 661 (“Gaiman’s contribution may not have been copyrightable by itself, but his contribution
had expressive content without which Cogliostro wouldn’t have been a character at all, but merely a drawing.
The expressive work that is the comic-book character Count Nicholas Cogliostro was the joint work of
Gaiman and McFarlane—their contributions strike us as quite equal—and both are entitled to ownership of the
copyright.”).
160
Huang, supra note 145, at 675. This thinking is largely based on the Nimmer approach to joint
authorship, which requires that each author “make more than a ‘de minimis’ contribution to the resulting
154
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Returning to persona–character protection, a joint-authorship claim could
easily be available when the Gaiman approach is adopted. Whether the
contributions of an actor were minimal (i.e., bringing the scripted words to life
and permitting the use of his features) would not matter concerning
ownership—an actor would have equal rights with a studio to use a character
in derivative works because intent to create a copyrightable end product
existed.161 However, reliance on the pre-Gaiman approach would mean that the
script and the expression of the script would both need to be copyrightable
materials and the actor would have needed to contribute at the character’s
initial creation, not just in the performance phase.162 Clearly there is
unpredictability in the application of joint-authorship standards.163
Additionally, because joint authorship is a pre-creation consideration, no
room exists to add a coauthor later in the character’s life span. This has
implications that would exclude the possibility of persona–character
protection. The inflexibility of the joint-authorship doctrine means that the
merger doctrine’s affirmative defense is a better solution. Merger’s use would
create flexibility in a fickle industry and prevent extensive litigation in the long
run.
B. Work Made for Hire That Eliminates Any Potential Claim to Ownership
Perhaps the most common objection to increased reliance on the merger
doctrine is that the actor is an employee of the studio and all work is work
made for hire. However, even if the actor is a Hollywood heavyweight, the
studio’s bargaining power substantially outweighs any actor’s power.164 The
entertainment industry is a business, with all parties seeking to make money.
But work made for hire, although common practice, unfairly advantages the

copyrighted work.” Id. at 677 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 6.07 (12th ed. 2004)). This is still the minority view regarding joint authorship, with most courts still
favoring the copyrightability approach for its ease in application. Timothy J. McFarlin, Father(s?) of Rock &
Roll: Why the Johnnie Johnson v. Chuck Berry Songwriting Suit Should Change the Way Copyright Law
Determines Joint Authorship, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 575, 589–91 (2015) (highlighting the “Childress”
test and the “mastermind” test as the dominant judicial analyses).
161
See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 661.
162
See Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000).
163
McFarlin, supra note 160, at 590.
164
See Jen Chaney, A Hollywood Agent Explains How Negotiations Work and Why Actresses Get Paid
Less,
COSMOPOLITAN
(Feb.
23,
2016),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/entertainment/movies/a53911/hollywood-agent-pay-gap-interview/ (explaining
how Hollywood negotiations work and how studios tend to control the conversations); see also Yu, supra note
97, at 395, n.252 (highlighting the criticism that work made for hire has incited amongst scholars).
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studio, while the actor completes most of the heavy lifting by bringing
audience appreciation for the character.165
The Copyright Act defines “work made for hire” as either “work prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” or “work specially
ordered or commissioned for the use as a contribution to a collective work.”166
To use the doctrine, the actor does not need to be a formal employee, but can
also be a formal independent contractor.167 Without a specific contractual
provision, there is a presumption “that the mutual intent of the parties is that
the title to the copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense
the work is done.”168 For the presumption to be invoked, there must be credible
evidence that the work was done at the instance and expense of the
commissioning party.169 The instance test is used to determine “whether ‘the
motivating factor in producing the work was the employer who induced the
creation.’”170
The impact of work made for hire on constructed personas and linked
characters is best illustrated by the District Court for the District of
Connecticut’s decision in Titan Sports, Inc. v. Hellwig.171 James Hellwig was a
World Wrestling Entertainment superstar who later decided to join World
Championship Wrestling instead and wanted to bring his former character with
him.172 Prior to the move, Hellwig legally changed his name to Warrior, adding
another dimension into the question of intellectual property ownership.173 The
overarching issue was whether the wrestling association, Titan, or the wrestler,
Hellwig, owned the intellectual property rights associated with Hellwig’s
character the “Ultimate Warrior.”174

165

Chaney, supra note 164.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
167
Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2004). If the person does not qualify as a formal
employee, work made for hire can be contracted for if “the commissioning party pays the author a monthly
stipend, pays health and other fringe benefits during the time the author works on the project, and exercises
overall though not necessarily daily supervision.” Id.
168
Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v.
Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965)).
169
See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2005);
Dolman, 157 F.3d at 712.
170
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 429 F.3d at 879 (quoting Self-Realization Fellowship Church v.
Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 2000)).
171
No. 3:98-CV-467 (EBB), 1999 WL 301695 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 1999).
172
Daniel Bilsky, From Parts Unknown: WWE v. Jim Hellwig in the Ultimate Battle for Character
Copyright, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 419, 419 (2009).
173
Id. at 420.
174
Titan Sports, 1999 WL 301695, at *1.
166
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Titan sought a declaratory judgment that would give copyright ownership
of the wrestler’s character under work made for hire.175 The court never
decided the merits of the case and rejected the motion to dismiss, arguing that a
jury must decide whether copyright infringement occurred.176 But the decision
highlighted the implications of whether it is proper for an employer to own the
rights to a persona–character.177 The character and the wrestler have become
synonymous, allowing the merger doctrine to take over, replacing copyright
protection with the right of publicity in the character.178
In these situations, similar to Hellwig and the running example of Stephen
Colbert, even if work made for hire dominates the copyright question, relying
on merger to override exclusive copyright would overcome this objection.
Because it would be impractical to eliminate work made for hire whenever an
actor felt a connection with a character, this method should be employed only
when the characters and the actors are inextricably linked.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE CHARACTER COPYRIGHT GAP AND MERGER’S ROLE IN
THE CHARACTER LIFE SPAN
A character typically does not begin as the counterpart of the actor that
crafted him, indicating that the control of a character has the potential to shift
over time. Entertainment is a constantly evolving medium—what was popular
one day is unpopular the next and vice versa.179 Copyright law needs to evolve
with the entertainment world. This Part highlights potential solutions to fill
copyright’s gap—particularly how using the personal affirmative merger
defense extends a royalty-free license to an actor and how the control over the
character can shift over time.

175

Id. at *1–2 (introducing the contract and later addendum signed by both parties in the dispute).
Id. at *14.
177
Bilsky, supra note 172, at 419–20.
178
Contra id. at 434 (“Even if a court were to accept this argument, The Ultimate Warrior was likely not
Hellwig’s sole creation, and even if he were the character’s driving, creative force, the character was still a
work made for hire, entitling WWE, as Hellwig’s employer, to copyright ownership.”).
179
E.g., Brett Gold, How Family Guy Got Canceled Twice and Still Made Seth MacFarlane a Star,
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 1, 2014, 8:11 PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/02/01/how-family-guygot-canceled-twice-and-still-made-s.aspx (explaining how Family Guy came back into the entertainment arena
simply because fans supported the show); A Look at Star Trek, TELEVISION OBSCURITIES (Sept. 1, 2006),
http://www.tvobscurities.com/articles/star_trek_look/ (discussing how Star Trek went from a cancelled
television series to a cult phenomenon).
176
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A. Merger as an Affirmative Defense Creates Royalty-Free Licenses to
Combat Change of Control Issues
Merger as a personal affirmative defense results in providing an actor
rights to the persona–character that are equal to the rights of a studio, allowing
both parties to retain control over licensing a character to third parties. In
effect, this grants an implied, or royalty-free, license to the actor.180 One
scholar defined an implied nonexclusive license in intellectual property:
[It] arises when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of
a work, (2) the creator (the licensor) makes the particular work
and delivers it to the licensee who requested it, and (3) the
licensor intends the that [sic] licensee-requestor copy and
distribute his work.181
Because the result of merger’s use creates this license, studios can avoid
litigation altogether by issuing an implied license for the persona–character to
the actor during the initial contractual phases. “While a copyright owner may
expressly grant a license to use the copyrighted work, a nonexclusive implied
license can be granted verbally or implied from conduct.”182 This pre-litigation
solution that uses the results of merger without its defensive purpose eliminates
control issues and future litigation, fosters creativity without fear of losing all
ownership, and “prevents the problem of parties who have specifically made
contributions on commission for a particular purpose totally preventing the
party who paid for the work from using any of it.”183
Actions taken within the scope of a valid implied license are an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement and are best illustrated in the case Latimer v.
Roaring Toyz, Inc.184 The issue in Latimer was whether a foreign company
exceeded the scope of an implied license that was granted by a
photographer.185 After assessing the three-prong test for an implied license, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that there was an implied

180
Michael Landau, Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation Through
Statutory Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157, 219 (2014).
181
Id. (quoting Lulirama, Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997)).
182
Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (W.D. Mo. 2010) (first citing Pinkham v. Sara
Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 1992); then citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A] at 10–36.1 (3d ed. 1995)).
183
Landau, supra note 180, at 219 (using Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998), as an
example by stating that “had Thomson attempted to enjoin all use of her contributions to Rent, the Larson heirs
could have brought up the ‘implied license’ doctrine”).
184
601 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2010).
185
Id.
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license, but noted that the scope of the license was still a question of fact.186 To
establish the scope, limiting instructions are required to be imposed upon the
grant of the implied license.187 These implied licenses allow original owners to
control how secondhand use is handled with regard to subsequent works and
successive owners.
Paired with an implied license is the idea of a royalty-free license. The
royalty-free license is mostly discussed in the patent context, but can apply to
copyright,188 especially when dealing with the copyrightability of inextricably
linked characters. With a royalty-free license, the original creator of the work
waives the right to compensation and the right to refuse a license to that
particular license holder.189
Due to the loss of coveted rights, many question the benefit to a studio in
issuing a royalty-free license. In some cases, such as when the character and
actor are synonymous, confusion in the marketplace can arise—whether it is
between a studio and an actor in control disputes or between audiences and an
actor–character in recognition respects. This remedy can prevent
administrative and legal problems for all involved190 because a finite set of
rights would attach to the royalty-free license.191 Since the issue concerns
ownership of the character by either the studio or the actor, this method of
combating control can be highly beneficial to eliminate any confusion in the
marketplace.
The character’s life is incredibly ephemeral and can change quickly. While
everyone involved in the character’s creation wants to profit, it is still
necessary to draw lines to make sure the use is equitable for all who contribute.
The goal is to protect everyone’s investment, from a studio’s interest in
developing characters in a television series or movie to an actor who brought
the character to life so much so that they are forever linked. By allowing an
186

See id. at 1236–38.
See id. at 1238.
188
See Eli Greenbaum, Puzzles of the Zero-Rate Royalty, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1 (2016); David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1913,
1954–55 (2003).
189
See Greenbaum, supra note 188, at 7–8; Teece & Sherry, supra note 188, at 1955 (“From an
economic standpoint, there is no necessary reason why the appropriate ‘price’ (royalty rate) for use of the
patented technology should be zero, as it is in a royalty-free license, merely because that technology was
incorporated into a standard.” (emphasis omitted)).
190
See Teece & Sherry, supra note 188, at 1954 (explaining that administration of a royalty-free license
is administratively simple; whereas, a traditional royalty rate requires substantial monitoring costs).
191
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1889, 1944–47 (2002) (highlighting the requirements and limitations for royalty-free licensing).
187
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actor to obtain a non-transferrable royalty-free license, there would be no
dispute about control. This solution prevents upheaval and is a contractual
solution to avoid placing characters in the archives while keeping the original
copyright intact.
B. Shifting Control Between the Studio and the Actor During a Character’s
Life Span
The character that begins its existence as unknown can one day shift to be
incredibly well-renowned. The first time an actor comes to set as a particular
character, the actor and character are seen as separate entities; there is no
relationship between the two yet. But, five seasons of a series or one successful
movie later, the actor and character can become one and the same to audiences.
Issues concerning persona–character control likely only arise at the peak of the
character’s popularity. Flash-forward ten years after the show’s cancellation—
the actor and character could be completely non-existent in the public
perception because the character is not remembered or the actor separated
himself from the character by moving on to a new role. In theory, the character
and actor can merge and unmerge, causing control issues throughout his life
span.
It has been argued that media companies should be entitled to character
copyrights because they are ever-changing entities that adapt to the current
temporal conditions.192 However, the actor’s contribution should also be
considered in the character’s evolution to meet society’s entertainment
demands. Media companies undoubtedly invest in the characters they
greenlight, but actors also invest their creativity and time to focus on bringing
a character to life, often sacrificing other opportunities in the process.193 When
a character and an actor are linked and a persona–character develops, the
media company is not the only one that deserves credit. The actor should be
entitled to persona protection that coincides with the studio’s copyright.
Balancing character control evolves into a symbiotic relationship between
studios and actors that promotes the key societal interest of fostering endless
creative expressions.

192
See Vincent James Scipior, Comment, The Amazing Spider-Man: Trapped in the Tangled Web of the
Termination Provisions, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 67, 87–88 (2011).
193
See Anjelica Oswald, These Famous Roles Were Almost Played by Completely Different Actors, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2016, 3:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/famous-roles-actors-turned-down-2016-4/
(presenting examples of actors who have had to decline roles due to other commitments).
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Because these societal interests are always changing, merging and
unmerging of persona–characters is common; therefore, the effectiveness of an
actor’s ownership entitlements depend on the time in which the claim is
brought to light.194 For example, Julia Louis-Dreyfus is notably linked with
playing Elaine on Seinfeld.195 Over the years, she detached herself from this
character and reinvented herself as a well-respected actress winning awards for
her role in Veep.196 In theory, she unmerged from the original character that
made her a household name. Meanwhile, Michael Roberts, who played Kramer
on Seinfeld, has been virtually unable to differentiate himself from the
character, turning to unsuccessful stand-up comedy routines to make it in the
industry again.197 He has not shed his Kramer persona–character, but there is
always the potential to do so if the right role comes along. Finally, Jerry
Seinfeld, creator and lead actor on Seinfeld, is quite literally one and the same
with the character he portrayed—the two have the same name, the same
mannerisms, and the same career, among other similarities.198 Despite any
differences between the actor and character, the similarities outweigh the
differences, and the idea that he will ever be severable from his character is

194
Typecast characters traditionally have the biggest issues regarding merging and unmerging because
they are continually cast as similar, yet different roles. See generally Jason Serafino, The 10 Most Typecast
Actors of All Time, COMPLEX (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2012/11/10-mosttypecast-actors-of-all-time/.
195
Julia Louis-Dreyfus, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000506/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).
Seinfeld ran from 1989 to 1998 and was a huge success among fans and critics, earning a total of seventy-one
wins and 182 nominations at various award shows during its tenure on-screen. Seinfeld: Awards, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098904/awards?ref_=tt_awd (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). See generally Seinfeld
(West-Schapiro 1989–1998).
196
Kevin Fallon, Emmys 2016: How Veep’s Julia Louis-Dreyfus Pulled Off the Funniest Comedy
Moment
of
the
Year,
DAILY
BEAST
(Aug.
28,
2016,
1:00
AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/08/28/
emmys-2016-how-veep-s-julia-louis-dreyfus-pulled-off-the-funniest-comedy-moment-of-the-year.html.
197
See Andrew Gumbel, Racism in Comedy: Kramer’s Sense of Humour Failure, INDEPENDENT (Nov.
22, 2006, 12:07 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/racism-in-comedy-kramers-senseof-humour-failure-425291.html; Morgan Sennhauser, What Happened to Michael Richards – What’s He
Doing Now Update, GAZETTE REV. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://gazettereview.com/2016/01/happened-michaelrichards-whats-now-update/.
198
Jerry Seinfeld, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/jerry-seinfeld-9542107#return-tostand-up (last updated Apr. 29, 2015). Jerry Seinfeld, the actor, developed the concept for the television show
with Larry David, to tell the untold story about life in New York City—a “show about nothing.” Larry Getlen,
The Backstage Drama That Nearly Brought Down “Seinfeld,” N.Y. POST (July 10, 2016, 1:04 AM),
http://nypost.com/2016/07/10/the-backstage-bickering-that-almost-brought-down-seinfeld/. The characters
were modeled after Seinfeld and David and people they interacted with throughout their lives in New York
City. Id.; see also Yu, supra note 97, at 412–13 (“Obviously, there are many overlapping characteristics
between the fictional persona of the ‘Jerry Seinfeld’ character and Jerry Seinfeld’s human persona, since the
actor was supposed to play himself in the television show. Nonetheless, there are still many differences
between the two personae.”).
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nearly impossible to fathom, meaning the idea and expression are fully
merged.
Considering the changes in the life span of a character and an actor’s role
in its development, there may be a time when copyright is not appropriate for
persona protection and the right of publicity should supersede copyright.199
However, right-of-publicity jurisprudence is unpredictable, so if studios do not
want to risk losing copyright on these persona–characters, then merger and
implied licenses should handle the shifting life spans.
The Copyright Act itself has not been overhauled since 1976, yet the everchanging nature of the entertainment industry requires creative solutions to
previously unforeseen problems related to the increased development of
persona–characters.
CONCLUSION
The entertainment industry today focuses intently on transforming actors
into brands.200 Actors are no longer valued solely for their craft, but must
develop into a public persona that perpetuates through choosing roles that
enhance their credibility, finding strategic endorsements, and exposing their
lives to the paparazzi. Because of this industry-wide branding trend, the
copyright issues related to ownership of persona–characters could become
much more prevalent in the coming years. Taking advantage of personal
affirmative defense merger principles can prevent future litigation and force
these control discussions to be a negotiation tactic. The goal is to allow
characters to continue to live on even if they are no longer on the original
platform from which they derived success. For the sake of promoting creativity
and fostering artistic expression, the time is now to form a cooperative

199

See generally Yu, supra note 97.
See Kevin Harrington, Celebrity Branding Is Making a Comeback - Tips for Success, FORBES (Aug.
18, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinharrington/2014/08/18/celebrity-branding-is-making-acomeback-tips-for-success/#2e4568d76ea2 (“Celebrity branding . . . is all about using a celebrity’s position of
prominence to start a conversation.”).
200
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relationship between studios and actors and to recognize the value of persisting
persona–characters in entertainment.
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